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SHOULD COMPENSATION SCHEMES BE
BASED ON THE PROBABILITY OF
CAUSATION OR EXPECTED YEARS OF LIFE
LOST?
James Robins*
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this essay is to give a succinct and accessible
summary of why I believe that compensation in tort suits should be
based not on probability of causation but rather on years (or
quality-years) of life lost.1 I only consider cases in which the
plaintiff claims that a hazardous exposure some years in the past is
the cause of a current medical illness, such as cancer or heart
disease. As I understand it, current legal standards hold that a
judgment should favor the plaintiff if and only if “it is more
probable than not” that the exposure “causally contributed to” or
“was a substantial contributing factor” to her disease.2 This
standard is often expressed as the requirement that the “probability
of causation” exceed ½, where the “probability of causation” (PC)
is the probability that the exposure causally contributed to the
development of the individual’s disease. It has been suggested that
* Harvard School of Public Health.
1
For complete scientific, mathematical, and philosophical arguments for
this position, see Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice,
and the Probability of Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS 321 (1999); James M. Robins
& Sander Greenland, Estimability and Estimation of Expected Years of Life Lost
Due to a Hazardous Exposure, 10 STAT. MED. 79 (1991); James M. Robins &
Sander Greenland, The Probability of Causation under Stochastic Model for
Individual Risk, 45 BIOMETRICS 1125 (1989).
2
L.A. Bailey et. al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 168-69 (FED. JUDICIAL CTR. ED. (1994).
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this standard can be operationalized via the formula
PC= (RR-1)/RR
(formula (1)), where RR is the rate ratio (equivalently, relative
risk) calculated from epidemiologic data comparing the disease
rate in a cohort of individuals exposed to the hazard to that in an
unexposed cohort. If one plugs a value of 2 for the rate ratio into
formula (1) one obtains:
PC=(2-1)/2=1/2
On the basis of this calculation, it has been argued that
whenever the rate of disease in the exposed cohort is less than
twice the rate in the unexposed (so the rate ratio is less than two),
PC must be less than ½ and thus the tort claim is without merit.
I. IS THE PROBABILITY OF CAUSATION ESTIMABLE FROM
EPIDEMIOLOGIC DATA
But is formula (1) correct? For if not, the above argument fails.
I will now show that formula (1) may be incorrect even if the rate
ratio is based on data from an ideal epidemiologic study with an
enormous sample. Specifically we will suppose we have data from
a (hypothetical) very large well conducted randomized trial. A very
large well-conducted randomized trial represents an ideal
epidemiologic study because, in a large study, randomization
guarantees that there is no confounding by unrecorded common
causes of the exposure and disease: exposure is only determined by
the flip of a coin and a coin flip does not cause disease. Indeed, in
a large randomized study of 2n subjects, one can view
randomization as producing n pairs of carbon copies with respect
to the disease outcome of interest, with exactly one copy in each
pair being exposed and the other being unexposed. That is, if one
member of the pair would get the disease at age 50 when exposed,
and at age 60 when unexposed, then the same is true for her carbon
copy. This statement is more than mere metaphor. Specifically, it
is a mathematical theorem that this statement becomes closer and
closer to being precisely correct as the size of the trial increases,
and furthermore any logical conclusion one draws concerning the
results of a large randomized trial under the assumption that each
exposed person has an exact unexposed carbon copy (with respect
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to disease outcome) will be a valid conclusion. This theorem gives
readers without advanced mathematical training a license to use
the carbon copy assumption as a walking stick or crutch (as needs
be) to aid them in analyzing a large trial.
Thus armed with our crutch, let us analyze a trial. Table 1
presents the data on a representative subset of size 10 from a
hypothetical large randomized trial in which at age 20, 500,000
subjects are randomized to the purported hazardous exposure and
five hundred thousand subjects remain unexposed. To keep matters
simple the disease outcome is death from any cause and all
subjects are followed to extinction. In Table 1 the 5 exposed
subjects die at ages 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80 while the five unexposed
die at ages 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90. We will suppose the data on the
total 1,000,000 subjects is just 100,000 copies of Table 1, in order
to spare us keeping track of 1,000,000 different individuals. The
rate ratio in Table 1 is by definition the death rate in the exposed
divided by the death rate in the unexposed. To calculate the death
rate in the exposed, we divided the number of deaths in the
exposed (5) by the total number of years lived by exposed subjects
(beginning at age 20 when the study began). Thus the rate in the
exposed is 5/( 20 +30 + 40 + 50 + 60)= 5/200 deaths per year and
the rate in the unexposed is 5/(30 + 40 +50+60+70) = 5/250 deaths
per year. Thus the overall rate ratio is 5/200 divided by 5/250
which is 1.25. Thus if we use formula (1) to calculate the
probability of causation, we obtain PC = (1.25-1)/1.25 = 0.2 = 1/5
which is less than ½ and thus no compensation would be awarded
to the plaintiff.

ROBINSTRYINGTOFIXPDF.DOC

540

5/4/2004 10:52 AM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
TABLE 1—AGE AT DEATH FOR 10 STUDY SUBJECTS
Death rate in
deaths/year

Age in years
20
5 exposed
subjects
5 unexposed
subjects

30

40

50

60

70

80

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

RR = 5/200 = 1.25
5/250

90
5/200
1

5/250

RR = (1.25-1) = 0.2
1.25

Let us now see if formula (1) gave the correct answer. To do so
we will use the carbon copy assumption but before doing so we
must think a bit more about just what the assumption entails.
Consider a given exposed subject, Helen, who is observed to die at
age 60. Helen would have died at some unknown age x if she had
been randomized to non-exposure. Under the carbon copy
assumption we are assured that, among the unexposed subjects in
Table 1, there is a carbon copy for Helen who dies at exactly the
age x that Helen would have died if unexposed. But, since we do
not know x, we cannot determine which of the unexposed persons
is Helen’s carbon copy. We conclude that although we may
assume each exposed person has an unexposed carbon copy,
nonetheless the data collected in the trial provides absolutely no
information as to which unexposed person is the carbon copy of a
given exposed person. Thus there are many possibilities consistent
with the trial data in Table 1.
Table 2a shows one such possibility. In the table, carbon copies
are linked by arrows. According to this linkage, four of the five
exposed individuals would have died at the same age had they
been unexposed, while the fifth exposed person died prematurely
due to her exposure. Thus the probability of causation is 1/5, which
agrees with that obtained using formula (1). If a PC of 0.5 was the
mandated legal cutoff, the judge would have been correct in his
decision to dismiss the suit based on formula (1).
[Technical note: The perceptive reader might disagree by
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arguing as follows. If (i) the judge believed that the PC was 1/5 in
the exposed population and thus that exactly one of the five
exposed subjects was harmed by exposure and (ii) from the study
data in Table 1, the judge had no way of knowing which of the 5
exposed subjects was the subject who died prematurely, he would
be correct in assigning a probability of causation of 1/5 to each and
thus in dismissing the suit. But in fact, given (i), the judge can
logically deduce from the data in Table 1 that the exposed person
who died at 40 must be the individual harmed and thus that (ii) is
false. As a consequence the judge should have concluded that PC
for the 4 other exposed subjects was zero, but that PC was one for
the subject dying at 40 and therefore the latter subject should have
been compensated. However, although (ii) is false in our highly
simplified and stylized example in which all subjects die at one of
6 distinct ages and the earliest death age in the exposed is strictly
less than in the unexposed, nonetheless (ii) will be true in a
realistic study. This is because in a realistic study both the exposed
and unexposed study subjects will have a positive (albeit small and
different) probability of dying at any age. As a consequence, given
(i), in a realistic study, the judge is correct to dismiss the suit.]
TABLE 2A—AGE AT DEATH FOR 10 STUDY SUBJECTS—ARROWS
LINK CARBON COPIES
Age in years
20

5 exposed
subjects
5 unexposed
subjects

30

Death rate in
deaths/year

40

50

60

70

80

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

90

5/200

1

5/250

Probability of causation 1/5 =.2
Total years of life lost due to exposure = 1 x 50 = 50

However Table 2b considers a second possible carbon copy
linkage that, like Table 2a, is also consistent with the data in Table
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1. Under this possibility, each exposed individual died ten years
prematurely due to her exposure. Thus the probability that
exposure was a substantial contributing factor to an exposed
subject’s death is 5/5=1, since it contributed to every exposed
subject’s demise. Since the PC is 1, we conclude under this carbon
copy linkage scenario, the quantity 1/5 calculated using formula
(1) is not the PC and the judge’s ruling to dismiss the case was in
error.
TABLE 2B—AGE AT DEATH FOR 10 STUDY SUBJECTS—
ARROWS LINK CARBON COPIES
Death
rate in
deaths/
year

Age in years
20

5 exposed
subjects
5 unexposed
subjects

30

40

50

60

70

80

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

90

5/200

1

5/250

Probability of causation = 1.0
Total years of life lost due to exposure = 5 x 10 = 50

This example has taught us that epidemiologic data, even ideal
epidemiologic data such as that in Table 1, although sufficient to
determine the rate ratio is not sufficient to determine the
probability of causation. The probability of causation is not in
general given by formula (1). Rather its magnitude depends
critically on which unexposed person is each particular exposed
person’s carbon copy and the data provide absolutely no
information on the matter. Indeed, whenever the rate ratio exceeds
1.0, the data will always be consistent with a carbon copy linkage
scenario analogous to Table 2b in which exposure contributes to
each exposed subject’s death and thus the PC is 1. Therefore an
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epidemiologist who testifies (as many have) that PC is given by
formula (1) is either giving false testimony or has failed to read
and/or understand the published literature, since the relevant
papers refuting formula (1) were published over 15 years ago in
leading epidemiologic, biostatistical, and risk analysis journals.
II. EXPECTED YEARS OF LIFE LOST AND COMPENSATION
Since the probability of causation cannot be determined from
even ideal epidemiologic data, how should compensation claims be
adjudicated? Let us return to Tables 2a and 2b but now, let us
calculate the total number of years of life lost (YLL) due to the
exposure. Under the carbon copy linkage scenario of Table 2a, the
YLL due to exposure is 50, the entire loss being suffered by a
single individual. Under the scenario in Table 2b the YLL is also
50, 10 years being lost by each one of the five exposed subjects.
These calculations are an example of a general phenomenon. In a
large ideal epidemiologic study, one can accurately determine the
total number of years of life lost due to exposure because the total
YLL depend only on the data and not on the unknown carbon copy
linkage scheme. On the other hand neither the probability of
causation nor the correct apportionment of the total number of
YLL among the exposed subjects can be empirically determined
from the data, since both depend on the unknown and empirically
unverifiable true carbon copy linkage scheme.
Nonetheless, I believe that awards in compensation cases
should be proportional to expected years of life lost calculated
under some reasonable agreed upon linkage scheme. Only in this
way will the award system serve the public health and “law and
economics” goal of providing rational properly-calibrated
economic incentives for defendants to avoid exposing plaintiffs to
hazardous substances. Specifically, under such an award scheme,
and given good epidemiologic data, the total payment made by the
defendant to the plaintiffs will be proportional to the total number
of YLL (and thereby does not depend on the chosen carbon copy
linkage scheme). The defendant then appropriately pays for each
year of life that he has cost the plaintiffs, providing a clear
incentive to minimize years of life lost. Under this scheme, the
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remaining question is how to divide the total award to the plaintiff
class among the individual plaintiffs. This must be negotiated
within the class because the distribution of YLL among the class
members cannot be empirically determined even from ideal
epidemiologic data, as the distribution depends on the unknown
true carbon copy linkage scheme.
The true carbon copy linkage scheme is determined by the
unknown biological mechanisms (at the sub-cellular and genetic
level) by which exposure causes disease.
III. FURTHER PROBLEMS WITH COMPENSATION BASED ON THE
PROBABILITY OF CAUSATION
Suppose, contrary to fact, we could determine the PC from
epidemiologic data via formula (1). Even then a compensation
scheme that pays in proportion to years of life lost would be much
preferable to one that only compensates plaintiffs whose PC
exceeds ½ (or equivalently that RR exceeds 2). To see why
consider the workers at a nuclear facility. If “RR greater than 2”
were the legal doctrine, companies would have no incentive to
decrease the amount of daily radiation exposure sustained by the
workforce. Instead the companies’ incentive would be to rotate or
replace workers just before their cumulative exposure was large
enough for RR to exceed 2. Indeed such a rotation policy is
common in the nuclear industry. If the cancer response to radiation
is linear in accumulated dose and without a threshold, then rotation
saves the company compensation costs at the expense of workers
lives. Specifically the total number of deaths caused by radiation
exposure would depend only on the total radiation dose received
by the worker population (regardless of the dose per worker). Thus
rotation has no effect on the number of radiation-induced deaths. It
only serves to distribute those radiation-attributable deaths over a
larger worker population, allowing the company to avoid paying
any compensation. This is disastrous public health policy.
Even compensation schemes that would pay in proportion to
the probability of causation (without a threshold of ½ ) have a
serious problem with fairness. Under such a payment scheme, the
estate of a 40-year old and of an 80-year old would be equally
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compensated for the same probability of causation. But the forty
year old has suffered a greater loss, because the 40-year old had
some 45 years of expected life cut short by her exposure, while the
80-year old had less than 10. This examples points to the fact that
even if one wanted to use probability of causation to determine
culpability, damages should be assessed in terms of expected years
(or quality years ) of life lost.
IV. A BACKDOOR INTO COMPENSATION BASED ON EXPECTED
YEARS OF LIFE LOST
Therefore, consider a compensation scheme that mandates an
award proportional to the expected number of years of life lost on
the hypothesis that exposure to the defendant’s product caused the
plaintiff’s death (i.e., the damages) multiplied by the probability of
culpability (i.e, by the probability the hypothesis is true). This
probability is, of course, precisely the probability of causation. To
implement this scheme one must assume a particular empirically
unverifiable carbon copy linkage scheme. It can be proved that this
compensation scheme is mathematically equivalent to simply
paying in proportion to overall expected years of life lost under the
assumed carbon copy linkage scheme. It therefore follows from
our earlier discussion that the total damages paid by the defendant
will be proportional to the total years of life lost due to the
hazardous exposure and will not depend on the particular carbon
copy linkage scheme. Indeed this conceptual separation of the
award into a product of a damages part proportional to expected
years of life lost (on the hypothesis that exposure to the
defendant’s product caused the plaintiff’s death)
times a
culpability part proportional to the probability of causation may be
a politically attractive approach to pushing for change in the
current compensation policy in the direction of a more rational
policy that pays in proportion to years of life lost.
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V. THE PROBABILITY OF CAUSATION VERSUS YEARS OF LIFE
LOST: SOCIAL, ETHICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
I have argued that award schemes that pay in proportion to
years of life lost are economically rational but that award schemes
based on probability of causation are not. More generally, expected
years of life lost is a more informative summary of exposure effect
than the probability of causation, since it takes into account when
(instead of just whether) exposure caused the death. Despite these
advantages of years of life lost, in certain settings there may be
ethical, social, or legal reasons for preferring to base compensation
on the probability of causation.
A. Example 1
Suppose two apparently healthy 40-year old men were killed
instantly when the brakes of a car in which they were traveling
failed due to a manufacturing error. Upon autopsy, one of the men
was found to have undiagnosed metastatic lung cancer. The second
had no underlying medical illness. If compensation is to be paid in
proportion to the probability of causation, then full compensation
would be paid to the estates of both men, since the probability is 1
that their deaths were due to brake failure. On the other hand, if
compensation is to be paid in proportion to years of life lost, the
man with the metastatic lung cancer would receive much less
compensation than the man with no underlying illness. It is clear
that one could raise legal, ethical, and social questions as to the
propriety of differentially compensating the families of the two
men in this setting.
Examples such as this show that choice of a measure can
involve issues beyond science, public health, or mathematics. To
further illustrate the sort of legal, social, and ethical questions
brought out by this example, consider the following modification.
B. Example 2
Suppose in the previous example that the first man had in fact a
recently diagnosed localized peripheral lung cancer for which he
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was to be operated on in one week’s time (instead of undiagnosed
metastatic lung cancer). Medical experts had given him a 60
percent chance of a complete cure and a 40 percent chance of death
from metastatic disease within 5 years. Should the damages
assessed against the car manufacture be less for the first rather than
the second man if the first man had a 40 percent chance of being
dead of lung cancer in 5 years? What if, one year later, a cure for
the dead person’s cancer was discovered?
VI. NON IDEAL EPIDEMIOLOGIC DATA
Heretofore, I have assumed that data from a large ideal
epidemiologic study are available. In practice, sample sizes may
not be large and there may be unquantified biases due to
uncontrolled confounding, misclassification, and measurement
error. These sources of uncertainty add greatly to the difficulty and
complexity of evaluating epidemiologic data for one can no longer
assume that the empirical rate ratio, calculated from the
epidemiologic data is equal to the rate ratio that would be found in
a large well-conducted randomized trial. This latter rate ratio we
will call the causal rate ratio. I conclude by briefly discussing the
consequences of having less than ideal epidemiologic data.
When assessing causality, epidemiologists measure the
strength of association by the empirical rate ratio: the ratio of then
rate of disease in the exposed to that in the unexposed. If the rate
ratio is 10 or greater it is hard-to-imagine unmeasured risk factors
or unconsidered biases could be responsible. On the other hand, if
the empirical rate ratio is 1.2, it is relatively easy to suppose that
unmeasured confounders or uncontrolled biases could explain the
association and therefore that the causal rate ratio is 1. This is true
even if the study population were of sufficient size to produce
narrow confidence intervals for the empirical rate ratio (e.g., (1.1,
1.3)) and an extreme p-value (e.g., p < 0.001).
Unfortunately, the public health benefits of controlling
(regulating) exposure are best measured in terms of the number of
lives saved (or the amount of serious morbidity prevented) per
thousand individuals exposed multiplied by the expected number
of years of additional life per life saved (which, in total, is the YLL
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from failing to regulate the exposure). The number of lives saved is
proportional to the causal rate difference rather than the causal rate
ratio.
To help understand the public health implications of these facts
consider the following example. The death rate from coronary
heart disease (CHD) is over 200 times that of soft tissue sarcoma.
Thus, a causal rate ratio of 1.2 for CHD corresponds to a much
larger causal rate difference than a causal rate ratio of 15 for soft
tissue sarcoma [since 200×(1.2-1)=40 is approximately three times
greater than (15-1)=14]. Therefore, it is far more important to
regulate an exposure associated with a causal rate ratio of 1.2 for
CHD than an exposure associated with a causal rate ratio of 15 for
soft tissue sarcoma. However, if the causal rate ratio for CHD is
1.2, it is likely that the empirical rate ratio will be less than 1.5 in
any study with sufficient power. In such circumstances, it will not
be possible to reach a scientific consensus that the true causal rate
ratio is greater than 1 because of concerns about unquantified
potential biases. In contrast consensus would exist that the causal
rate ratio for soft tissue sarcoma is greater than 1. Therefore the
exposure which actually takes far fewer lives would be
preferentially regulated. Similarly, the infrequent exposure-caused
deaths from soft tissue sarcoma would be compensated in the
courts while the more frequent exposure-caused deaths from CHD
would go uncompensated.
It follows that an improved tort system will never, in itself,
succeed in adequately protecting the public health; one must also
regulate exposure to substances that, based on current evidence,
are suspected of being harmful, even in the absence of scientific
consensus as to harm.

